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Performance Analysis for Physical Layer Security
in Multi-Antenna Downlink Networks with Limited
CSI Feedback
Xiaoming Chen and Rui Yin
Abstract—Channel state information (CSI) at the transmitter is
of importance to the performance of physical layer security based
on multi-antenna networks. Specifically, CSI is not only beneficial
to improve the capacity of the legitimate channel, but also can be
used to degrade the performance of the eavesdropper channel.
Thus, the secrecy rate increases accordingly. This letter focuses
on the quantitative analysis of the ergodic secrecy sum-rate in
terms of feedback amount of the CSI from the legitimate users
in multiuser multi-antenna downlink networks. Furthermore, the
asymptotic characteristics of the ergodic secrecy sum-rate in
two extreme cases is investigated in some detail. Finally, our
theoretical claims are confirmed by the numerical results.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, CSI feedback, ergodic
secrecy sum-rate, asymptotic characteristics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the open nature of wireless channel, information
transmission security is always a critical issue in wireless
communications. Traditionally, secure communication is real-
ized by using cryptography technology. With the development
of interception technology, cryptography technology becomes
more and more complex, resulting in high computation. In
fact, it has been proven by information theory that wireless
security can be guaranteed by physical layer technology,
namely physical layer security [1] [2]. The advantage of
physical layer security lies in that it is independent of the
interception ability of the eavesdropper, so it is appealing in
secure communications with low-complexity nodes.
The performance of physical layer security depends on
the difference between the legitimate channel capacity and
the eavesdropper channel capacity, namely secrecy rate [3].
Intuitively, multi-antenna techniques can improve the legiti-
mate channel capacity and degrade the performance of the
eavesdropper channel simultaneously by exploiting the spatial
degree of freedom. Thus, physical layer security based on
multi-antenna system draws considerably attentions [4] [5].
In [6], the problem regarding the maximum secrecy rate
in multiple-antenna system was addressed by designing an
optimal transmit beam, assuming that full CSI related to
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the legitimate and eavesdropper channels is available at the
transmitter. However, in practical systems, the eavesdropper
is usually passive and hidden, so the transmitter is difficult
to obtain the eavesdropper CSI. Under such a condition, it
seems impossible to provide a steady secrecy rate, and thus
the ergodic secrecy rate is adopted as a useful and intuitive
metric to evaluate security. In [7], the ergodic secrecy rate
for Gaussian MISO wiretap channels was analyzed and the
corresponding optimal transmit beam was presented. The work
shown in [8] considered the scenario where all nodes have
multiple antennas, and the ergodic rate for such an MIMO
secrecy scenario has been developed. Another advantage of
the multi-antenna secrecy system lies in that it supports
concurrent transmission of multiple legitimate users. On one
hand, multiuser transmission can improve the ergodic secrecy
sum-rate. On the other hand, the inter-user interference can
weaken the interception effect. In [9], the ergodic secrecy sum-
rate for orthogonal random beamforming with opportunistic
scheduling was presented. Yet, in multiuser downlink net-
works, orthogonal random beamforming may suffer perfor-
mance loss if the number of users is not so large. In [10],
the authors proposed to convey the quantized CSI from the
legitimate user to the transmitter for transmit beam design in
a single receiver secure scenario.
Combining the advantages of multiuser transmission and
CSI conveyance, this letter proposes to perform limited feed-
back zero-forcing (ZFBF) at the transmitter in multiuser multi-
antenna downlink networks [11]. We focus on the quantitative
analysis of the ergodic secrecy sum-rate, and derive its closed-
form expression in terms of the feedback amount. Further-
more, the asymptotic characteristics of the ergodic secrecy
sum-rate is analyzed, so as to provide an explicit insight on
system parameter optimization for physical layer security in
multiuser multi-antenna downlink networks.
The rest of this letter is organized as follows. We first
provide an overview of the multiuser secure system model in
Section II, and then the ergodic secrecy sum-rate is derived in
Section III. We investigate the asymptotic characteristics of the
ergodic secrecy sum-rate in Section IV. Some numerical results
are given to show the accuracy of the theoretical analysis in
Section V. Finally, the whole letter is concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a homogeneous multiuser multi-antenna down-
link network employing physical layer security for secure com-
munication, where a base station (BS) equipped with Nt > 1
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Fig. 1. An overview of the multi-antenna downlink network employing
physical layer security.
antennas communicates with K single antenna legitimate users
(LU), while a passive single antenna eavesdropper attempts to
intercept the transmission information, as shown in Fig.1. In
this letter, we only consider the case of K = Nt, since the
multi-antenna system can admit Nt users at most for each time
slot. Note that if K > Nt, user scheduling can be adopted
to select Nt users. We use hk to denote the Nt dimensional
legitimate channel vector from the BS to the kth LU with
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero mean and
unit variance complex Gaussian entries. In addition, we use
αg to denote the Nt dimensional eavesdropper channel vector
from the BS to the eavesdropper, where α is the relative path
loss defined as the ratio of path loss of the eavesdropper
channel and that of the legitimate channel, and g is the channel
fast fading distributed as CN (0, INt).
The whole network is operated in slotted time. At the
beginning of each time slot, the LU first estimates the CSI
related to its legitimate channel, and then chooses an optimal
codeword to quantize the CSI from a predetermined quantiza-
tion codebook Hk = {hˆk,1, · · · , hˆk,2B} of size 2B according
to the following selection criterion by assuming perfect CSI
at the LU:
hˆk,opt = arg max
hˆk,i∈Hk
∣∣∣h˜Hk hˆk,i
∣∣∣2 (1)
where h˜k = hk‖hk‖ is the channel direction vector. Next, the
index of the optimal codeword is conveyed by the kth LU and
hˆk,opt is recovered at the BS from the same codebook as the
instantaneous CSI of the kth legitimate channel. Based on the
Nt LUs’ feedback information, the BS determines the optimal
transmit beam wk for the kth LU by making use of zero-
forcing beamforming (ZFBF) design method. Specifically,
given hˆk,opt, we first construct its complementary matrix
Hˆk = [hˆ1,opt, · · · , hˆk−1,opt, hˆk+1,opt, · · · , hˆNt,opt]
Taking singular value decomposition (SVD) to Hˆk, if V⊥k is
the matrix composed of the right singular vectors with zero
singular values, then we randomly choose a unit norm vector
from the space spanned by V⊥k as the transmit beam wk. Since
V⊥k is the null space of Hˆk, we have
hˆ
H
i,optwk = 0, i 6= k (2)
Thus, the receive signals at the kth LU and the eavesdropper
can be expressed as
yk =
√
PhHk wkxk +
√
PhHk
Nt∑
i=1,i6=k
wixi + nk (3)
and
y0 =
√
Pαg
Nt∑
i=1
wixi + n0 (4)
respectively, where xk is the normalized Gaussian distributed
transmit signal for the kth LU, P is the transmit power, nk
is the additive Gaussian white noise with variance σ2. In this
context, the ergodic secrecy sum-rate can be expressed as
R =
Nt∑
k=1
E [log2 (1 + γk)− log2 (1 + ζk)]
=
Nt∑
k=1
E [log2 (1 + γk)]−
Nt∑
k=1
E [log2 (1 + ζk)] (5)
where γk = |h
H
k wk|
2
Nt∑
i=1,i6=k
|hH
k
wi|2+σ2/P
and ζk =
|gHwk|2
Nt∑
i=1,i6=k
|gHwi|2+σ2/α2P
are the SINR related to the kth
LU’s signal at the ith LU and the eavesdropper. (5) follows
the fact that the legitimate and eavesdropper channels are
independent of each other.
The focus of this letter is on the quantitative analysis of the
ergodic secrecy sum-rate in terms of feedback amount B and
BS antenna number (LU number) Nt.
III. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF PHYSICAL LAYER
SECURITY
In this section, we intend to derive the ergodic secrecy
sum-rate R in a multiuser multi-antenna downlink network
in presence of a passive eavesdropper. As seen in (5), the
key of computing the ergodic secrecy sum-rate is to obtain
the distributions of the SINRs γk and ζk. In what follows,
we first give an investigation of their distributions employing
limited feedback ZFBF. According to the theory of random
vector quantization (RVQ) [12], the relationship between the
original and the quantized channel direction vectors is given
by
h˜k =
√
1− ahˆk,opt +
√
ask (6)
where a = sin2
(
6 (h˜k, hˆk,opt)
)
is the magnitude of the
quantization error, and sk is an unit norm vector isotropically
distributed in the nullspace of hˆk,opt, and is independent of a.
Substituting (6) into the definition of the SINR γk, we have
γk =
|hHk wk|2
a‖hk‖
Nt∑
i=1,i6=k
|sHk wi|2 + σ2/P
(7)
d
=
χ22
Γ(Nt − 1, δ)
Nt∑
i=1,i6=k
β(1, Nt − 2) + σ2/P
(8)
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d
=
χ22
δχ22(Nt−1) + σ
2/P
(9)
where d= denotes the equality in distribution, and δ = 2−
B
Nt−1 .
Eq. (7) holds true by applying the property of limited feedback
ZFBF in (2). In (8), wk is designed regardless of hk, so
|hHk wk|2 is χ22 distributed with the probability density function
(pdf) of exp(−x). According to the theory of quantization cell
approximation [13], the product of channel gain ‖hk‖2 and the
magnitude of quantization error a is Γ(Nt − 1, δ) distributed
with the pdf of 1
δNt−1(Nt−2)!
xNt−2 exp(−xδ ). Additionally,
since sk and wi are i.i.d. isotropic vectors in the Nt − 1
dimensional null space of hˆk,opt, |sHk wi|2 is β(1, Nt − 2)
distributed with pdf of (Nt − 2)(1 − x)Nt−3 [12]. In (9),
the product of a Γ(Nt − 1, δ) distributed random variable
and a β(1, Nt − 2) distributed random variable is δχ22, so the
sum of Nt − 1 independent δχ22 distributed random variables
is δχ22(Nt−1) distributed, where the pdf of the δχ
2
2(Nt−1)
distribution is x
Nt−1 exp(−x)
Γ(Nt−1)
. Let y ∼ χ22(Nt−1) and z ∼ χ22,
the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of γk is derived as
F (x) = Pr
(
z
δy + σ2/P
≤ x
)
=
∫ ∞
0
FZ|Y (x(δy + σ
2/P ))fY (y)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
(
1− exp
(
−x(δy + σ
2
P
)
))
yNt−1 exp(−y)
Γ(Nt − 1) dy
= 1− exp(−xσ
2/P )
(1 + δx)Nt−1
∗
∫ ∞
0
exp(−(1 + δx)y)((1 + δx)y)Nt−1
Γ(Nt − 1) d((1 + δx)y)
= 1− exp(−xσ
2/P )
(1 + δx)Nt−1
(10)
where FZ|Y (·) is the conditional cdf of z for a given
y, fY (·) is the probability density function (pdf) of y,
and Γ(·) is the Gamma function. (10) holds true since
exp(−(1+δx)y)((1+δx)y)Nt−1
Γ(Nt−1)
is the pdf of (1 + δx)y.
Examining the definition of ζk, it can be considered as a
special γk without CSI feedback, namely B = 0 or δ = 1, so
the cdf of ζk can be derived based on (10) as
G(x) = 1− exp(−xσ
2/α2P )
(1 + x)Nt−1
(11)
Substituting (10) and (11) into (5), we have
R= Nt
∫ ∞
0
(
log2(1 + x)
(
F
′
(x) −G′(x)
))
dx
= Nt log2(e)
∫ ∞
0
(
ln(1 + x)
(
F
′
(x) −G′(x)
))
dx
= Nt log2(e)
∫ ∞
0
(
1− F (x)
1 + x
− 1−G(x)
1 + x
)
dx
=
Nt log2(e)
δNt−1
∫ ∞
0
exp(−xσ2/P )
(x+ 1)(x+ δ−1)Nt−1
dx
− Nt log2(e)
∫ ∞
0
exp(−xσ2/α2P )
(x+ 1)Nt
dx
=
Nt log2(e)
δNt−1
I1
(
σ2/P, δ−1, Nt − 1
)
− Nt log2(e)
Γ(Nt)
(Nt−1∑
m=1
Γ(m)
(
− σ
2
Pα2
)Nt−1−m
−
(
− σ
2
Pα2
)Nt−1
exp
(
σ2
Pα2
)
Ei
(
− σ
2
Pα2
))
(12)
where
I1(x, y, z) =
∫ ∞
0
exp (−xt)
(t+ 1)(t+ y)z
dt
=
z∑
i=1
(−1)i−1(1− y)−iI2(x, y, z − i+ 1)
+ (y − 1)−zI2(x, 1, 1)
I2(x, y, z) =


exp(xy)Ei(xy) z = 1
z−1∑
k=1
(k−1)!
(z−1)!
(−x)z−k−1
yk
+ (−x)
z−1
(z−1)! exp(xy)Ei(xy) z ≥ 2
and Ei(z) =
∫ z
−∞
exp(t)
t dt is the exponential-integral function.
F
′
(z) denotes the derivative of F (z) with respect to z. The
first term of (12) is derived following [14] and the second term
is obtained according to [Eq. 3.3532, 15] Thus, we obtain the
ergodic secrecy sum-rate as a function of feedback amount B,
antenna number Nt, channel condition α and transmit power
P , so as to provide an insight on parameter selection in secure
communications.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, for the sake of evaluating the performance
easily, we analyze the asymptotic characteristics of ergodic
secrecy sum-rate in some extreme cases.
A. Interference-Limited Case
If transmit power P is quite high or LU number is so large,
the receive noise is negligible with respect to the inter-user in-
terference. Thus, the SINRs are reduced as γk = |h
H
k wk|
2
Nt∑
i=1,i6=k
|hH
k
wi|2
and ζk = |g
Hwk|
2
Nt∑
i=1,i6=k
|gHwi|2
, respectively. In this case, the cdfs can
be expressed as
F (x) = 1− 1
(1 + δx)Nt−1
(13)
and
G(x) = 1− 1
(1 + x)Nt−1
(14)
Similar to (12), the ergodic secrecy sum-rate can be computed
as
R =
Nt log2(e)
δNt−1
∫ ∞
0
1
(x+ 1)(x+ δ−1)Nt−1
dx
− Nt log2(e)
∫ ∞
0
1
(x+ 1)Nt
dx
= Nt log2(e)B(1, Nt − 1)2F1 (Nt − 1, 1;Nt; 1− δ)
− Nt log2(e)/(Nt − 1) (15)
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where B(x, y) is the Beta function and 2F1(α, β; γ; z) is the
Gauss hypergeometric function. Eq. (15) is derived according
to [eq. 3.1971, 15]. It is found that in interference-limited case,
the ergodic secrecy sum-rate is independent of transmit power
P and channel condition α. Given Nt and B, the ergodic
secrecy sum-rate is a constant.
B. Noise-Limited Case
If the inter-user interference is negligible due to low transmit
power or strong noise, the SINRs can be approximated as
γk =
P
σ2 |hHk wk|2 and ζk = Pα
2
σ2 |gHwk|2, respectively. As
analyzed earlier, both |hHk wk|2 and |gHwk|2 are χ22 distributed,
so the cdfs of the SINRs are given by
F (x) = 1− exp (−σ2/Px) (16)
and
G(x) = 1− exp (−σ2/(Pα2)x) (17)
In this case, the ergodic secrecy sum-rate can be computed as
R = Nt log2(e)
(
exp(σ2/P )Ei(σ2/P )
− exp(σ2/(Pα2))Ei(σ2/(Pα2))) (18)
It is found that the ergodic secrecy sum-rate in noise-limited
case is independent of feedback amount. In other words, the
ergodic secrecy sum-rates with different Bs asymptotically
approach the same value as P decreases.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
To examine the accuracy of the derived ergodic secrecy
sum-rate in multiuser multi-antenna downlink networks, we
present several numerical results in the following scenario:
we set Nt = 5 and B = 4. In addition, we define SNR=
10 log10
P
σ2 as the transmit SNR.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of theoretical and simulation results.
Fig.2 compares the ergodic secrecy sum-rates obtained by
theoretical analysis and numerical simulation with different
relative path losses α. It is seen that the theoretical result
is quite consistent with the simulation result in the whole
SNR region, which validate the high accuracy of the derived
result. Note that relative path loss α has a great impact on
the ergodic secrecy sum-rate in the low SNR region, since
the small α, indicating the weak intercepting signal at the
eavesdropper, leads to a large ergodic secrecy sum-rate. With
the increase of SNR, the ergodic secrecy sum-rates with
different αs asymptotically approach the same value, which
is equivalent to the interference-limited case whose ergodic
secrecy sum-rate is independent of relative path loss and SNR,
as shown in (15). Moreover, it is found that the ergodic secrecy
sum-rate is not an increasing function of SNR, since both
the legitimate and eavesdropper channel capacities increase
as SNR adds. Thus, there is an optimal SNR in the sense of
maximizing the ergodic secrecy sum-rate, which provides an
important insight on system parameter selection, especially in
green communications that concentrate on energy efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
This letter focused on the performance analysis for physical
layer security in multiuser multi-antenna downlink networks
with quantized CSI feedback, and derived the closed-form
expression of ergodic secrecy sum-rate in terms of feedback
amount and channel condition. Through asymptotic analysis,
we obtained the relatively simple expression of ergodic secrecy
sum-rate in two extreme scenarios. Numerical simulation re-
confirmed the high accuracy of the derived theoretical results.
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